Tokyo 2020 Olympic fallacies and fallout

To finish this summary of his talk it would seem that the recent drive for tourism in the nuclear damaged Fukushima prefecture would actually be impacted during and after the Olympics. As the deadline for the games approaches clean up from the tsunami and nuclear disaster would be diverted into the Olympic infrastructure program as the tough IOC deadline approaches for July 2020.

 

Screenshot from 2017-07-26 18:32:43Published 26 July 2017

by Shaun McGee

In this article I wish to report on the issues with the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. This is based on a presentation by Andrew Zimbalist the sports economist at the Foreign Correspondence Club of Japan on the 26th July 2017

As Prof. Zimbalist began his presentation he commented that the promised profits to the country as “Public dialogue is propaganda”.  He added to this by saying that there would be “no positive impulse to the economy”.

He followed up with a breakdown estimate of costs. There are three cost projections. The first being the initial costing to some 5 billion dollars. The second is a more recent report stating 12.5 billion dollars (less the contingency fund that was removed of some 2.5 billion dollars that is supposed to cover the cost over runs). The third was a more recent costing of 27 billion dollars!

He stated that the infrastructure that are being built specifically for the Olympics are likely to be “white elephants” with only a single use. He also said that Tourism will actually suffer during and after the games and that it would be unlikely to benefit the local economy.

Concerning infrastructure, he said that some 8,000 acres of land were used in the Beijing games and that Japan would be sorely stressed to provide all the land the International Olympic Committee (IOC) requires for its planned infrastructure.

The economy would be sorely tested as tax benefits etc for private investment would be at the cost of the tax payer. There would be no Tariffs on building materials imported. Free land would be offered to private investment companies and low indirect loans.

He mentioned the cost of security at being in the region of 2 billion dollars but did not mention that civil society groups would be targeted as they were in London in 2012.

To finish this summary of his talk it would seem that the recent drive for tourism in the nuclear damaged Fukushima prefecture would actually be impacted during and after the Olympics. As the deadline for the games approaches clean up from the tsunami and nuclear disaster would be diverted into the Olympic infrastructure program as the tough IOC deadline approaches for July 2020.

The video from which this article was derived can be found here;

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Nuclear Hotseat notes 1 may 2017 Radioactive hidden wildfires

Notes for this weeks Nuclear Hotseat podcast European segment

Siberian wildfires with no mention of issues of the risk of radiation contamination;

http://siberiantimes.com/other/others/news/nuclear-town-on-fire-with-residents-choking-from-smoke/

No mention of radiation contamination on the wildfires around Namie in the Fukushima prefecture;

https://www.rt.com/news/386662-fukushima-forest-fires-soldiers/#.WQaIanZz1L8.facebook

Some mention on the issue of re-contamination on this blog;

“Forest fires in Namie, Fukushima within the areas of highest contamination dubbed the “difficult to return zone” have burned since the weekend.”

http://www.fukuleaks.org/web/?p=16276

New science paper highlights the issues with smaller particles causing more harm than originally thought which is relevant to the wildfire pollution issues of small radioactive particles etc being inhaled and getting into the bloodstream;

https://www.rt.com/news/386350-study-pollution-heart-condition/

Staying indoors for a long time can cause lung cancer

https://www.businessghana.com/site/news/general/145192/legal

Further resources showing the staggering levels of contamination in the wildfire areas;

http://safecast.org/tilemap/?y=37.4893&x=140.9947&z=13&l=0&m=2

Radiation reading done by a local activist before the wildfires in an area in the supposedly “safe zone”;

Incredible contamination in Namie, Fukushima where people are being forced to live!

Mirrored, Source for article – https://fukushima311voices.wordpress.com/2017/04/22/incredible-contamination-in-namie-fukushima/

The evacuation orders of the most populated areas of Namie, Fukushima were lifted on March 31st this year.

“Fukuichi area environmental radiation monitoring project” has published airborne radiation measurements map and soil surface density map. The results are simply incredible. This is far much worse than in Radiation Control Zone. Any area becomes designated as such when the total effective dose due to external radiation and that due to radioactive substances in the air is likely to exceed 1.3mSv per quarter – over a period of three months, or when the surface density is over 40,000Bq/m2. In the Radiation Control Zone, it is prohibited to drink, eat or stay overnight. Even adults are not allowed to stay more than 10 hours. To leave the zone, one has to go through a strict screening.

Namie’s radio contamination is far over these figures! And people are told to go back to these areas.

福島県浪江町の人口集中地域の避難指示が3月31日に解除されました。
主として南相馬市に在住の市民の皆さんが作っておられる団体「ふくいち周辺環境放射線モニタリング・プロジェクト」が浪江町の空間線量マップと土壌汚染マップをアップされました。結果は驚くべきものです。外部放射線による実効線量と空気中の放射性物質による実効線量との合計が三月間、三か月ですね、三月間につき一・三ミリシーベルトを超えるおそれのある区域、または土壌の表面密度が4万ベクレルを超えると、放射線管理区域に指定され、成人でも10時間以上は滞在できず、飲食もできず、宿泊もできません。そこから出るときには厳しいスクリーニングを受けなければなりません。地図を見ると、浪江町の状態は放射線管理区域をはるかに超える汚染の状態です。

浪江町の汚染はこの数値をはるかに超えるものです。そして、こんなところに住民の皆さんは帰れと言われているのです。

Here is the posting of “Fukuichi area environmental radiation monitoring project” in their FB page on April 20th.

以下、「ふくいち周辺環境放射線モニタリング・プロジェクト」の投稿です。

___

第38回モニタリング活動で測定した浪江町の避難解除地域のギョロガイガーによる地上高1mの空間線量マップが完成しましたので、UPします。
100箇所のポイントのうち、1μSv/hオーバーは実に56ポイントありました。マップでは1μSv/hオーバーを赤枠で囲みましたが、最高は3.71μSv/hでした。
なんとこの数字は、1年間に換算すると32mSvにもなります。こんなところに、被災者を帰還させて良いのでしょうか?

We are uploading the map of airborne radiation rate map measured by GyoroGeiger, the Android supported Geiger counter. Dose rate is measured at 1m from the ground.
At 56 points over 100 measuring points, the dose rate was over 1µSv/h. These points are indicated in red. The highest measure is 3.71µSv/h. Conversion to annual dose gives 32mSv. Is it allowed to make evacuees return to such areas?

____

Here is the soil contamination map uploaded on April 15th. They even had to introduce 7 scales, for the contamination is so high and they couldn’t deal with the scales they were using before! It is a violation of human rights to let people live in such areas.

こちらが4月15日投稿の土壌汚染地図です。今までの区分では対処しきれなかったため、新たに7段階区分を導入したそうです。このようなところに人を住まわせるのは、基本的人権の侵害です。

The Halden nuclear reactor in Norway, a danger to all of Europe? by Pierre Fetet

ob_38aa92_carte-de-situation

“….This “nuclear safety authority” (NRPA) reported only 0.002% of the radioactive release!….”

“….On the French side, I also contacted the IRSN on the same day, but this one has remained silent until now. As for ASN, he referred me to the press releases of NRPA and IFE. We’re going round in circles … No wonder that rumors of meltdown in Halden bloom in several websites! The IFE and the NRPA, while remaining opaque on this “incident”, themselves cause legitimate questions that quickly turn into rumors. At present, these two organizations are obliged to make communiqués to counter the rumors they have helped to form!….”

“….The NRPA told Criirad that it had asked IFE to correct the design defect in the Halden reactor, otherwise the restart permit would not be given…..” Pierre Fetet

WARNING

This article, like all the other articles I have written in this blog for 6 years, represents the result of my research and the opinion of a simple European citizen who is worried about the air he breathes. It is absolutely not the expression of the CRIIRAD, as a Norwegian site reported yesterday. I made a mistake of appreciation regarding the designation “accident” of the INES scale in the first version of this article. I corrected this error quickly and ask my readers to apologize. However, the event that took place in Halden is, in my opinion, an accident that has had negative effects on the environment, but it should not be called a “nuclear accident” because significant radioactive releases are authorized by Our nuclear societies and low doses are not recognized as hazardous by nuclear safety organizations, although they are proven to be responsible for genetic mutations and diseases. I do not want to panic, it’s not my goal. I simply want to inform and alert on the dangers of nuclear power and the atmospheric pollution that we all undergo without our knowledge. I persist and sign, whatever may be said, the Halden reactor is dangerous, like all other nuclear reactors in the world. This is my opinion, based on sources that everyone can consult. PF (updated 28/03/17)

Radioactive pollution of iodine-131 in Europe at the beginning of 2017 made it possible to highlight the activity of a reactor unknown to the general public, the Halden research reactor in Norway. Although he could not be held responsible for the radioactive cloud that spread from Spain to Norway in January-February, it was learned from the Norwegian NGO Bellona that this reactor had experienced an “incident” in October latest. A Norwegian Nuclear Safety Agency report dated 13 February 2017 reveals the danger to users of this reactor. We move away from Fukushima but not so much because the problem is the same: failure of reactor cooling, risk of explosion of hydrogen, rejection of iodine 131 and other carcinogenic radionuclides, MOX, … do you not recall this?

Author – Pierre Fetet. Original article in Frenchhttp://www.fukushima-blog.com/2017/03/le-reacteur-nucleaire-de-halden-en-norvege-un-danger-pour-l-europe.html?utm_source=_ob_share&utm_medium=_ob_facebook&utm_campaign=_ob_sharebar (link takes you to extensive technical picture library of the reactor and site not fully reproduced in this article (images shown here are courtesy of IFE).

ob_8e6ac9_inauguration.JPG
SUMMARY

1. One of the oldest reactors in the world still in operation

2. Partners of the Halden Reactor Project

3. The “Incident” of 24 October 2016

4. Experimentation of new fuels

5. What was the nature of the radioactive clouds?

6. Halden Reactor Shutdown

7. IFE needs public money to process waste

8. Why do we have nothing more about this event?”

9. Requiring clarification

1. One of the oldest reactors in the world still in operation

The Halden reactor was inaugurated and activated in 1959. Yes, you read: 1959! It is located in Halden, a coastal town in southeastern Norway, near the border with Sweden, 1200 km from France. With a power of 25 MW maximum, this almost 60 years was created for the research.

This boiling water reactor (BWR) is not visible from the outside. It is located 100 meters inside a hill under a rocky cover of 30 to 50 meters. The reactor hall is 10 meters wide, 30 meters long and 26 meters high. The reactor room also contains fuel pits for the temporary storage of the fuel used. The underground complex has a volume of 4500 m3. The cooling circuits are located inside the reactor room and in the reactor inlet tunnel. The control room and service facilities are located outside the excavation. The service buildings contain offices, workshops and laboratories.

The energy produced is delivered in the form of steam through heat exchangers and conduits to Norske Skog Saugbrugsforeningen which uses it for paper production.

The primary function of the Halden reactor is to test fuels and components of nuclear reactors. A fuel charge consists of a combination of test fuels from partner country organizations and fuel assemblies that provide a basis for reactivity for reactor operation. The core consists of about 110 to 120 fuel assemblies, including test fuel, in an open hexagonal network.
ob_579a01_3-halden-core

In Halden, internationally accepted codes, rules and recommendations are used only in an advisory capacity, meaning that experimenters are aware of international safety standards but may disregard them as they see fit. Yet according to the CEA, the material tests and the analyzes carried out indicate that the reactor can operate safely well beyond the year 2020.

In Halden, internationally accepted codes, rules and recommendations are used only in an advisory capacity, meaning that experimenters are aware of international safety standards but may disregard them as they see fit. Yet according to the CEA, the material tests and the analyzes carried out indicate that the reactor can operate safely well beyond the year 2020.

2. Partners of the Halden Reactor Project

It is managed by the Norwegian Institute of Energy Technology (IFE) and is the most important of the joint projects of the NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD body): more than 130 scientific, institutional and industrial organizations Of 21 countries are or have been involved in the Halden reactor project.

ob_da9d2b_hrp-globe

The partner countries of this atomic project are Germany (Society for the Safety of Power Plants and Reactors – GRS), Belgium (Nuclear Research Center – SCK CEN), Czech Republic (ÚJV Řež), Korea (Korean Institute Atomic Energy Research Center (KAERI), Denmark (Technical University of Denmark – DTU), United Arab Emirates (Nuclear Regulatory Authority – FANR), Spain (Center for Energy Research), United States (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission – USNRC), Russian Federation (ROSATOM Fuel Company – JSC TVEL), Finland (Ministry of Employment and Economics – TVÖ), France France – EDF), Hungary (Center for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences – MTA), Italy (National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development – ENEA), Japan Japan Regulatory Authority (NRG), Kazakhstan (Ulba Metallurgical Plant – UMP JSC), Norway (Energy Technology Institute – IFE), the Netherlands (NRG Company), the Slovak Republic (VÚJE Trnava) And the CIEMAT technology), the United Kingdom (National Nuclear Laboratory – NNL), Sweden (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority – SSM) and Switzerland (Federal Inspectorate of Nuclear Safety – ENSI). It is therefore a hub of the world nuclear village.

3. The “incident” of 24 October 2016

The terse text of the IFE press release reads as follows: “On Monday, 24 October, at 1.45 pm, an unintentional release of radioactive iodine occurred in connection with the handling of test fuel in the Halden reactor. Rejection poses no threat to IFE employees or the environment. ”

It is so succinct that the NPRA, the Norwegian nuclear safety agency equivalent to the ASN in France, insisted on carrying out an inspection to control the installation and to know the details of this event.

Thanks to the website www.EuropeanNewsWeekly.wordpress.com which has edited the English translation of the Norwegian NPRA report, we know the contents of this document which we have translated into French. You can read the entire report in the appendix at the bottom of this page or by downloading it in pdf format via the links below;

[Pdf] WHOLE REPORT HALDEN in French; http://data.over-blog-kiwi.com/0/54/77/39/20170325/ob_43d3b0_rapport-entier-halden.pdf

WHOLE REPORT HALDEN in English (with opinon introduction) Courtesy of the NRPA via http://www.Bellona.org; https://europeannewsweekly.wordpress.com/2017/03/14/fuel-error-at-ife-halden-the-handling-of-the-incident-nrpa-report-in-english/

To summarize, while the reactor was stationary – officially for maintenance since October 8, 2016 – a handling error on Monday, October 24, 2016 at 1.45 pm, of a damaged fuel led to the sudden creation of a cloud Which has invaded the reactor hall and its surroundings. Due to the danger, the site staff were immediately evacuated.

The Norwegian Nuclear Safety Authority (NRPA) was notified by the IFE (Energy Technology Institute, responsible for the operation of the reactor) only the following morning; Then, after shutting down the reactor room ventilation system (which stopped the release to the environment), IFE informed the NRPA on Tuesday night (25 October) that the situation was under control. Given the strange management of the incident by the operator, NRPA conducted a surprise inspection at the IFE headquarters in Kjeller. And there, big surprise: the event was still in progress! As a result, the NRPA immediately initiated a strengthened IFE inspection which enabled it to oversee, partly on site, the management of the “incident” until 2 December.

On November 1, after the NRPA called for greater transparency, the IFE reported that the reactor was “in a very special state”. What is a reactor “in a very special state” when it was stationary for more than three weeks? Well, this translates into “temperature fluctuations in the reactor vessel, an indication of increased neutron flux in the core of the reactor and the danger of hydrogen formation”. Nothing less than that. Normally, when a reactor is stopped, the chain reaction is stopped in its entirety. In this particular case, it did not seem to be the case because an increase in the neutron flux indicates a resumption of activity, signed moreover by a production of iodine which is a product of fission. Moreover, the increase of the heat in the core of the reactor, without a cooling circuit, can lead to the degradation of the zirconium sheaths surrounding the fuel. Now, from a certain temperature, the zirconium oxidizes on contact with water and produces hydrogen, highly explosive gas. This phenomenon produced at least three violent explosions in Fukushima in 2011.

To overcome this crisis, the NRPA authorized the reopening of the reactor hall ventilation on 1 November. There were therefore two air releases: the first on 24-25 October 2016 when the event occurred until the ventilation was closed and the second on 1 November.

Following this event, NRPA revoked the license to operate the reactor. However, the IFE is counting on the NRPA to obtain the necessary authorizations in order to continue the experiments. Halden Research Director Atle Valseth says the reactor will be restarted by June 2017.

4. Experimentation of new fuels

Since 2013, the Halden reactor has been used to test a new thorium fuel. It is a small Norwegian-based nuclear energy company, Thor Energy, that has begun testing the potential of thorium to replace uranium in nuclear reactors. At the time of the “incident”, IFE completed a three-year research program that began in January 2015. What was the nature of the research? According to the World Nuclear Association, the current experiment consisted of irradiation of a thorium-MOX fuel. The test fuel is in the form of pellets composed of a dense thorium oxide ceramic matrix containing about 10% plutonium oxide as a fissile conductor. The instability of the reactor at the time of the “incident” may come from this new fuel. The sorcerer’s apprentices of the atom have no limit! It was also during an “experiment” that the Chernobyl disaster, still under way 31 years later, began.

Norway is tempted by thorium because it has large reserves of this material on its territory. Thorium production would have only an economic objective because it does not need nuclear power: Norway produces the bulk of its electricity through renewable energy.

The US company Lightbridge and the IFE have formalized a collaboration in 2015 on the study of a new metallic nuclear fuel developed by Lightbridge. The Halden reactor was designed to allow testing of samples under actual conditions, that is, under the operating conditions of a commercial reactor. Were these trials, which were scheduled for 2017, started earlier than planned? According to Lightbridge CEO Seth Grae, they had to generate data needed for the accreditation of the new fuel by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its deployment by the nuclear utilities in the reactors Around the world. “We have absolute confidence in IFE’s expertise and the Halden facilities, which are recognized in the nuclear energy industry for their excellence. Said this very enlightened man.

ob_dd48eb_ae2256

Halden thorium-plutonium fuel assembly (Zdnet source)

5. What was the nature of the radioactive clouds?

According to the NPRA, the discharge was 150 million becquerels for iodine 131 and 24 million becquerels for iodine 132, without mentioning any other radioactive substances that may have been released. The IFE, contacted on March 19 by me, did not wish to communicate the integral nature of the radioactive clouds of October-November 2016 nor the proportions of the different radionuclides composing them. It would do so at the request of the NRPA, if the nuclear authority asked for it. The IFE says it will have to submit a detailed report to the NRPA on the 2016 releases before May 1, 2017. But it does not say whether this report will be public. Moreover, the NRPA, also contacted on 19 March, did not provide any answer to the same question.

On the French side, I also contacted the IRSN on the same day, but this one has remained silent until now. As for ASN, he referred me to the press releases of NRPA and IFE. We’re going round in circles … No wonder that rumors of meltdown in Halden bloom in several websites! The IFE and the NRPA, while remaining opaque on this “incident”, themselves cause legitimate questions that quickly turn into rumors. At present, these two organizations are obliged to make communiqués to counter the rumors they have helped to form!

It is an association that finally got the missing information. The www.Criirad.org also contacted the NRPA on 16 March. Thanks to it, we have a little more information, and not the least!

The releases of October 2016 did not include only becquerels of iodine131 and 132. They also contained 8 178 billion becquerels of radioactive rare gas and 550 billion becquerels of tritium! We are very far from the 184 million becquerels of radioactive iodine of the reassuring release of the NRPA! This “nuclear safety authority” reported only 0.002% of the radioactive release! How to trust the NRPA after such a lie?

ob_b6e904_tableau-rejets.JPG
According to the Criirad, in view of the absence of measuring stations close enough to the Halden reactor and devices to preserve the memory of the contamination, “a fine characterization of the impact of the releases on October 24 2016 and the following days “.

6. Halden Reactor Shutdown

It is highly desirable that all European countries should demand that this reactor be stopped permanently because of its great age, especially since the NRPA does not subject it to international nuclear safety standards.

This “incident” showed the great functional inconsistency regarding the containment of the site: the reactor cooling system is linked to the ventilation system of the reactor hall! This means that in the event of a serious accident, there is no alternative but to release into the atmosphere any gaseous or aerosolized radioactive pollution. It is a reactor with a false confinement. Until then, Halden residents were reassured that the facility is under 40 meters of rock and that they therefore risk absolutely nothing. This is totally false. For the underground burial of radioactive waste in the Meuse, the same lie is used: if there is a fire, even 500 meters below ground, the pollution will come out through the aeration chimneys. The confinement is absolutely not assured.

The fact that the Halden reactor is under 40 meters of rock is no guarantee. On the contrary, in the event of a hydrogen explosion, the site can quickly become inaccessible due to landslides and produce atmospheric radioactive pollution through the vent chimneys or any other orifice created by the explosion. Underground accidents are always possible and, once produced, are extremely costly and difficult to manage, especially in the presence of plutonium. See the recent example of WIPP in New Mexico!

The NRPA told Criirad that it had asked IFE to correct the design defect in the Halden reactor, otherwise the restart permit would not be given. This must be followed closely. Indeed, the IFE intends to restart before June the reactor to satisfy its international customers. Doing work would make it run in deficit for the year 2017. Does the NRPA have enough authority to require this important safety work?

7. IFE needs public money to process waste

The Halden reactor was shut down on 8 October 2016, officially due to maintenance, but above all to save money. Indeed, the IFE is affected by the economic slowdown, with a loss of turnover of approximately 5 million euros. To reduce the costs of 2016, this institute has put a portion of its employees in technical unemployment (98 employees set at 50% and 27 redundancies pure). In fact, the research reactor is very expensive when it is stopped and the management of its waste is also a major problem. Amounting 17 tons of various spent fuel from its own tests since the 1960s in the Halden and Kjeller reactors, Norway no longer knows what to do with its waste. According to the Norwegian site TU, “fuel is unstable and potentially self-igniting in contact with air. It is therefore not suitable for long-term storage “.

In 2016, the IFE had asked the Norwegian government for 8 million euros to start repackaging its long-lived waste, but got only three. The Institute relies on AREVA and the Hague to reprocess this hazardous waste. He hopes to convince the Norwegian parliament of the need to deal with this cumbersome and dangerous waste, in particular by focusing on the 18 containers of spent fuel that are currently stuck in a storage well of the former Jeep 1 reactor at Kjeller, Abandoned since the shutdown of the reactor 50 years ago …

8.Why do we have nothing more about this event?”

Because 130 scientific, institutional and industrial organizations from 20 countries are involved in the OECD’s Halden reactor project. They want to be able to experiment quietly, protected from overly restrictive international nuclear safety regulations. The atmospheric tests are done as in the old days. We pollute without counting, and especially without saying anything, “so as not to complicate communication with the general public by too much data” (NRPA).

The world nuclear village being wetted up to the neck by the polluting activities of this outdated reactor, it is understandable that no official body would want to disclose a case of this kind. In the nuclear industry, when you lift the carpet, you discover horrors … Oddly, there is a lack of public data on the days when there was the strongest rejection.

The fact that radiological barriers have been damaged and that the public has been exposed to significant doses is a cause for concern: 35% of the annual discharge limit of Krypton 85 (10.7 years) and 44% Of the annual discharge limit of Xenon 131m (period of 12 days) in ten days, it’s a lot of a sudden. Of course, all official agencies, accustomed to lying to the population, will continue to talk only of iodine-131, although the NRPA was caught in the act of lying.

9. Requiring clarification

All of these falsely transparent bodies, IFE, NRPA, must clearly explain what happened in October-November 2016 in Halden. They must answer these questions:

– What event damaged the fuel tested?

– Why did IFE not alert NRPA immediately?

– What event produced an increase in neutron flux?

– Was the fuel tested thorium-plutonium?

– Was it an experiment of MOX thorium in real conditions?

– What was the exact nature of the radioactive releases from 24-25 November and 1 November 2016? The NRPA information provided to the Criirad is insufficient, as there is no mention of measures on possible releases of carbon 14, cesium 137, cobalt 60, plutonium, etc.

– What was the proportion of radionuclides for each of these clouds?

– Why the Halden reactor does not obey the international safety rules of post-Fukushima nuclear installations?

It is rather unbearable to learn by chance that the European atmosphere is polluted by radioactive gases or aerosols from an outdated reactor and all this with the blessing of the security agencies that are supposed to protect us. A parliamentary inquiry should be required from MEPs to shed light on this case and on all installations likely to release dangerous products into the atmosphere, especially since iodine 131 has still been detected In March in Svanhovd, northern Norway.

10. Annexes

– Communiqué of the Criirad of 24/03/17 (1st update) – http://balises.criirad.org/pdf/CP_CRIIRAD_170324_Norvege_Halden.pdf

– Bellona article of March 3, 2017 – http://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2017-03-norways-halden-reactor-a-poor-safety-culture-and-a-history-of-near-misses#bio-10363

– Rreport of NRPA of 13/02/17:

French translation from the English version by Pierre Fetet and Odile GirardSource ;

English version: https://nuclear-news.net/2017/03/12/fuel-error- At-ife-halden-the-handling-of-the-incident-nrpa-report-in-english /

Report in French with added technical  images http://www.fukushima-blog.com/2017/03/le-reacteur-nucleaire-de-halden-en-norvege-un-danger-pour-l-europe.html ( NRPA report in French on the bottom of the page)

Nuclear Hotseat notes for 21 March 2017

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Image courtesy of CCI celebrating World Downs Syndrome Day (UN)

Link to the French report on the Unusual practices that have EDF fined for recruitment of workers for Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant via Cyrus, Ireland and Poland. The courts have issued fines, the contractors have been going insolvent and generally prevaricating with the court process;

http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2017/03/21/bouygues-condamne-en-appel-pour-travail-dissimule_5098101_3234.html

Update on the Iodine 131 story and  the Halden connection Questions being asked by CRIIRAD ;

Questions about Iodine in Europe asked by CRIIRAD France in new report 14 March 2017 #Halden

Latest information on the Belarus AP court case that has gone to the higher court. The AP reporter has been asked to ignore the government laboratory evidence and apologise to the Dairy company that is selling contaminated milk to customers both domestic and abroad. Strontium 90 is worse than Cesium 137 as it does not leave the human body once ingested and seeks bones and heart tissue as it replaces calcium.

http://www.metronews.ca/news/world/2017/03/16/ap-protests-ruling-against-reporter-over-chornobyl-story.html

More on that story with a scientific explanation of the problem here;

 

Link to Chernobyl Children International web page. They deal with a number of Chernobyl radiation damaged conditions and their web page is celebrating World Downs Syndrome Day;

http://www.chernobyl-international.com/

Link to evidence of the connection between Downs Syndrome and radiation here;

Abstract
The objective of this study is to investigate the prevalence of Down syndrome (DS) associated with Chernobyl fallout. Maternal age-adjusted DS data and corresponding live birth data from the following seven European countries or regions were analyzed: Bavaria and West Berlin in Germany, Belarus, Hungary, the Lothian Region of Scotland, North West England, and Sweden from 1981 to 1992. To assess the underlying time trends in the DS occurrence, and to investigate whether there have been significant changes in the trend functions after Chernobyl, we applied logistic regression allowing for peaks and jumps from January 1987 onward. The majority of the trisomy 21 cases of the previously reported, highly significant January 1987 clusters in Belarus and West Berlin were conceived when the radioactive clouds with significant amounts of radionuclides with short physical half-lives, especially (131)iodine, passed over these regions. Apart from this, we also observed a significant longer lasting effect in both areas. Moreover, evidence for long-term changes in the DS prevalence in several other European regions is presented and explained by exposure, especially to (137)Cs. In many areas, (137)Cs uptake reached its maximum one year after the Chernobyl accident. Thus, the highest increase in trisomy 21 should be observed in 1987/1988, which is indeed the case. Based on the fact that maternal meiosis is an error prone process, the assumption of a causal relationship between low-dose irradiation and nondisjunction is the most likely explanation for the observed increase in DS after the Chernobyl reactor accident.
  Link here

And this link as well;

Effects of the Chernobyl Catastrophe
-Literature Review-
Dr. med. Alex Rosen
Heinrich-Heine
University Clinic
Düsseldorf
, Germany
January
Here is the link to the article explaining the UK pressure to take renewables more seriously than they have been;
“….It would also prove to be a major blow to Government plans to cut carbon emissions by encouraging 16GW of new nuclear investment to power the UK grid by 2030. More than two thirds of the country’s power generation capacity is due to retire between 2010 and 2030 meaning major investment in other technologies would be needed to bridge the gap…..”

 

Also, The UK is looking for 100 billion pounds for its Small Modular Reactor business and Bechtel has decided to withdraw from the UK program which may have wider implications for the international development of this technology. Rolls Royce, who are also involved with the UK SMR program are having financial difficulties and legal problems;

https://www.constructionnews.co.uk/markets/sectors/nuclear/bechtel-pulls-out-of-mini-nuclear-development/10018348.article#.WMxkJYrB2xo.facebook

And this link shows the problems the UK is having concerning the Euratom Treaty obligations post Brexit causing further problems with the UK international agreements for things like the purchase of Fuel rods, University student academic access and nuclear waste disposal;

And finally, also to do with Euratom and the agreement within it to do with health effects that is being challenged by an number of people within the European community area, with the support of Prof Chris Busby. An update on the situation concerning European applications (watch till the end to see the Swedish Euratom representative begin to panic);

 

Questions about Iodine in Europe asked by CRIIRAD France in new report 14 March 2017 #Halden

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Here is a roughly translated report from independent radiation monitoring and safety NGO CRIIRAD dated from the 12 March 2017  asking questions about the missing data measurements and unaccounted isotope measurements.

Clarification of CRIIRAD about the releases of a nuclear reactor in Norway

Confusion

There has been confusion for a few days on
social networks, and messages that are very Worrying as “Alert in
this day (12 March 2017) it is learned that Norway has contaminated
all of Europe with radioactive iodine 131 for several weeks (it is
even said that contamination began at the end of October).. “.
This is a confusion between two events:
Iodine-131 (artificial radioactive isotope) has been detected at low levels in the ambient air of several European countries in January 2017. The exact origin of iodine-131 is not known and several hypotheses are possible. See CRIIRAD press release of February 14, 2017.
There was an incident on a nuclear reactor in Norway in October 2016, but there is not, to our knowledge, an Incident or Accident currently operating in Norway and the measuring stations whose the results are published on the website of the European network EURDEP do not show currently abnormal radioactivity in Norway or on nearby countries.
Releases of iodine 131 from a Norwegian reactor in October 2016 :
There was, on 24 October 2016 at 13:45 hours a significant incident on the EIT nuclear reactor at Halden South –East of Oslo in Norway, when handling the spent fuel. The Norwegian Radiological Protection reported this incident in a Press release of
25 October 2016 .
This incident, which led to the evacuation of the personnel and resulted in radioactivity released into the atmosphere.
The Norwegian authorities have estimated the release to 150 million becquerels for iodine 131 and 24 million becquerels for iodine 132. It should be noted that the document does not specify how these estimates have been carried out, nor their level of reliability. It is surprising that Authorities did not show the Status of other releasable radioactive substances (tritium,Carbon 14, radioactive rare gases). Fortunately, the situation has
been finally kept under control.
The “incident” of October 2016 poses many Safety issues (Origin of the incident), lack of transparency (the operator declared the incident 20 hours later), insufficient
monitoring data (No evaluation of all Radioactive discharges).”
The Norwegian NGO Bellona had expressed concern in 2004 about the Safety and Denounced the escapes of Heavy water and the high tritium releases (Radioactive isotope of hydrogen).
In the case of discharges of iodine-131 of 24 October 2016, in Norway, measurement stations of iodine 131 in particulate form located at Osteras, about 100 kilometers north – West of Halden and Arland, to 500 kilometers to the north had not highlighted measurable impact. (data available on the website EURDEP).
Iodine-131 particulate has indeed been detected
on the air filters of the October 17 to 24, 2016 with values of the
order of 0.37 to 0.45 μBq/m3, but the measurement period stopped
Around 6am so It was before the official time of release
On the following two weeks , published levels of
Iodine 131 were lower than detection limits between <0,3 µBq/m3
and these results raise a number of questions.
It is surprising, for example, to note the
absence of sampling for the Osteras station during the period of
supposed releases. Indeed, the analyzes focus on a first filter for
the period from 17 to October 24th at 6:34 am, then a second filter
of 25 October at 11 H30 to 26 October at 10 H49. There is therefore
no measure from October 24 at 6:35 am to October 25 at 11:29 am?
It is also possible to deplore the absence of measurement of iodine-131 in gaseous form which is in many cases predominant by contribution to the particular form .
And of course, it should be emphasized that the
measuring stations are at a great distance from the plant and do not
count of the air quality within a radius of a few kilometers.
To date, there is nothing to make the link between the iodine 131 from the Halden reactor in Norway in October 2016 and the detection of iodine 131 in the atmosphere of European countries in January 2017.
Let’s remember that the Half-life of iodine-131 is 8 days. The activity of iodine-131 rejected on 24 October 2016 would therefore be divided by a factor of 1300 to 15 January 2017 . In addition, the highest levels of particulate iodine
131detected in Europe in January 2017 were in Poland (5.9 μBq / m3).
However, it would be desirable for independent
analyzes to be carried out in the vicinity of the Halden reactor in
order to assess the levels of exposure of local residents (air, soil,
precipitation and food chain analyzes).
Writing: Bruno
CHAREYRON, engineer in nuclear physics, director of the CRIIRAD
laboratory with technical support from Jérémie MOTTE, environmental
engineer, head of the CRIIRAD air monitoring department.

Report in French;  http://balises.criirad.org/pdf/2017-03-14_Note_CRIIRAD_Norvege.pdf

Report from the NRPA in Norway from 13th February 2017 with an introduction (with links to other evidence and articles gathered) can be found here; https://nuclear-news.net/2017/03/12/fuel-error-at-ife-halden-the-handling-of-the-incident-nrpa-report-in-english/

Fuel Error at IFE Halden – The handling of the incident – NRPA report in ENGLISH

“…“The example given by Norway strongly reinforces the importance and the value of establishing and applying IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance that contributes to the continuous improvement of physical protection and nuclear security,” said Muhammed Khaliq, Head of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security of Materials and Facilities Section.

The IPPAS team, led by Kristóf Horváth, Deputy Director General of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA), comprised eight experts from seven nations, including the IAEA representative, Mr Khaliq….” Oct 2015 Oslo

nuclear-lobby-dispute

This report has been translated from the Norwegian in order to clarify the situation concerning confusion from some of the Pro nuclear lobby and anti nuclear movement highlighted on social media these past weeks. I have tried to get more information from sources to answer the issue as to why there was deleted data from EURDEP radiation mapping in Sweden and Norway just after this report was completed but to no avail, thus far.

The IFE were contacted by Peter for their comment on this incident. The initial impression Peter was given was that the Bellona report was inaccurate and claims by the IFE seems to show a concerted effort to minimise the risks that this reactor poses to the public. If a large plume had come from the Halden reactor on the 17th February into Sweden then the ESPOO treaty concerning cross border contamination on radiation may have been broken. This plume went on for some days and seems to have also hit most of southern Norway (east and west) as the wind changed direction.

However, there have been many claims that the Halden reactor was responsible for all iodine releases in Europe these past months and this is not true. Using EURDEP, I have tracked, as best as i could, the probable sources. There are two main sources of Iodine from Hungary  (January 2017)and Norway  (Oct 2016 and Feb 2017) and some smaller sources of gamma energy from Spain, Germany, France and possibly from the Italian area. This seems to have ruled out Halden as the only source of Iodine and all the reports of USA military planes checking out the Russian involvement in this scenario are false (this was also claimed by some main stream press also).

The IAEA has been efficient at removing most of the spikes and leaving no data. These spikes are removed as a matter of course in some countries because they claim it is normal Radon from the environment (NORM) but this is mostly not the case.

As to why Sweden might not want to highlight any plumes concerning issues on the ESPOO Treaty from Halden into their country, we only have to see the recent statement by the Swedish Radiation Safety Agency (SRSA) concerning the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research group (NKS) from the 9 March 2017;

“Above all, these evaluations have demonstrated that our approach is correct: We should continue to take part in these research fora,” says Eva Simic, director of research at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. “An additional perspective is that the fora underline the beneficial impact of NKS and Halden on our work, and highlight a number of areas we need to work on in order to benefit further from the collaboration. In other words, they provide valuable decision-making input when we discuss future research initiatives.”

It would seem that the Halden management of IFE has many friends that support anything they say but Bellona and the NRPA are holding IFE to task, though it is not widely reported by the main stream media. Bellona represent one of the few organisations that are trying to provide truly independent Science Media Journalism and even the Norwegian Governments own department the NRPA is trying to hold the IFE accountable and promote transparency in a technology that is renowned for secrecy and risk taking. Anyway, here is the full report by the NRPA on the Halden reactor and there should be another due in the near future to assess how IFE are dealing with the issues outlined in this report.. This link shows the original article and links posted on nuclear-news. Thanks to NIls Bohmer and the NRPA for allowing me to publish this report in full. Shaun McGee aka arclight 12th March 2017

Full report

Our ref .: 16/00889 /
The caseworker .: Tonje Sekse
Date: 02/13/2017

Fuel Error at IFE Halden – The handling of the incident

1 Introduction
Monday 24 October 2016 at. 1:45 p.m.
there was an incident in the treatment of the damaged reactor fuel at the Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) in its facility in Halden. As a result, there was an urgent release of radioactive substances into the reactor hall and into the surroundings. The reactor hall was evacuated and closed off. The IFE notified The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) Tuesday morning (October 25) and the ventilation system of the reactor hall was stopped. The discharge into the environment then stopped. The IFE informed the NRPA that the situation was under control on Tuesday night.

The day after the notification, Wednesday 26 October, The NRPA chose to conduct unannounced inspection at the IFE at their headquarters in Kjeller in connection with the late notification and the handling of the incident. During this inspection it was revealed that the situation was still unresolved and that there was still a discharge to the reactor hall. Because of this, the NRPA decided to create an enhanced inspection order for the IFE to follow up the late notification, the missing information, and the handling of the consequences of the incident, including the efforts to gain further control on the discharge from the damaged fuel.

As part of the enhanced inspection, a tighter communictaion regime between IFE and the NRPA was created for the future handling of the situation. IFE reported daily progress of the work, the size of the emissions in the reactor hall and into the surrounding environment, and planned future work. Personnel from the NRPA were present with IFE Halden during all operations in the reactor hall during the inspection period. As a part of the enhanced inspection, the NRPA conducted several interviews with personnel from IFE that were involved in handling of the incident. Most interviews were conducted on 10 and 25 November 2016. In addition, the NRPA had several video conferences with IFE personnel and their management. The NRPA also obtained copies of the relevant logs.

Their was a major inspection meeting between IFE and the NRPA in Halden, 25 November 2016. Present at the meeting were the following representatives from the NRPA and the IFE:

IFE: Atle Valseth – research director NSF
Geir Mjønes – department manager HBWR
Tord Walderhaug – s
afety chief / Radiation Protection Supervisor (Halden)
Kari Lyumer Moum – section head chemistry
Pål Thowsen – senior reactor engineering
Lise Moen – senior reactor physicist
Wolfgang Wiesenack – Research Director

NRPA: Per Strand – Department director
Kristin Frogg – technical director
Øyvind Gjølme Selnæs – senior adviser
Tonje Sekse – senior adviser

2. Current regulations
The enhanced inspection authority was notified on 25 October 2016 under the unannounced inspection on the same day. The Inspection was authorised by the Atomic Energy Act § 13 on inspection, and in the Pollution Control Act § 48 also on inspection.

3. Background, scope and implementation
The inspection was decided on and initiated in conjunction with the unannounced inspection on the 26 October 2016. As a part of the enhanced inspection the NRPA had ongoing dialogue with IFE in supervision period and has conducted several interviews with personnel at IFE that were involved in handling of the incident. The focus of the interviews was the individual’s role in the process of handling the damaged fuel, but also with the situation with the reactor. NRPA received copies of relevant logs in connection with this inspection.

The enhanced inspection was completed on December 2.

4. General impression
Previously the NRPA, as part of the unannounced inspection on the 26 October 2016, had reported errors for missing information and the late notification of the incident, ref. Inspection report 13/2016 . The enhanced inspection involves communication from IFE to NRPA, and the further handling of the incident.

The NRPA conducted interviews and obtained logs as part of the inspection. During the inspection meeting on 25 November 2016 IFE were handed the Emergency log, logs from the reactor engineer (of the control room), and log of the water chemistry for the relevant period. In addition the IFE subsequently forwarded logs of plant control, “the night round,” daily instructions and construction announcements, and print from Procsee showing signals / trends.

The primary cooling circuit is an important part of the safety system of the reactor. Valves which regulate the circulation of cooling water in the primary cooling circuit is dependent on the process air to be open. When the ventilation system of the reactor hall was stopped and the valves closed on Wednesday, the 26 October, one of the consequences was that the process air had to be closed off. Circulation in the primary cooling circuit was therefore suspended. The reactor was shut down when the incident with the damaged fuel occurred on the 24 October. IFE had informed that earlier that they had stoppages in circulation in the primary cooling circuit for longer periods of time in connection with maintenance and other work while the reactor was out of service.

From Thursday 27 October the safety of the reactor was a daily recurring theme between NRPA and IFE, where the NRPA repeatedly questioned the opinions about reactor safety and the closure of the primary cooling circuit. The IFE reported back that the situation was not unusual and that the reactor could stay in that condition for several weeks to come. The NRPA wanted greater transparency and traceability in the safety assessments that were made and demanded in a video meeting on Tuesday 1 November at. 2:00 pm, better documentation with declarations with signatures from the responsible operations and safety managers. A few hours later the same evening received the NRPA a concerning message from IFE that the reactor was “in a very special condition.”

The IFE asked NRPA for permission to open the valves and start circulation in the primary circuit as soon as possible. The reason for the message were the differences in temperature in the reactor tank, the indication of an increased neutron flux in the reactor core and the danger of hydrogen formation. For the NRPA this is a serious message and a completely different situation than the one the IFE had described a few hours earlier. This message was correct, but the NRPA questioned why this was not investigated earlier both because of security, but also because the regulatory authority had demanded this. The IFE received permission to open the valves and start the work to start primary cooling circuit and discharging the contaminated air from the reactor hall. Despite that there was still emissions from the damaged fuel emissions were within the emission limits in the permit.

The same night the IFE called in the reactor physicists who assessed the situation and found that indications were likely due to the impact on the instruments that were not calibrated for the conditions in the reactor hall as they were. IFE completed the planned measures, opened valves and started the primary cooling circuit. The situation was stable after this.

The NRPA takes the situation awareness, safety assessments and communication to the NRPA around reactor safety in the days leading up to IFE detected indication of increased neutron flux November 1st very seriously. The reactor was then, as the IFE described it, in a “very special state,” that was both unusual and not described in the safety report. The nuclear instrumentation were not calibrated for the conditions that were in the reactor hall. Nor was it the case, as stated earlier, that this was a situation that was normal and described in the safety report.

The NRPA observed that during the interviews given afterwards there was somewhat contradictory explanations and that there was still some confusion. The NRPA believes it is important that all conditions will be taken seriously, both technical failures and inadequate procedures. IFE must focus on efforts to improve the safety culture of the organization and follow up error reports from previous inspections.

It is pertinent to mention that after November 1, in the subsequent work on the handling of the damaged fuel and the ongoing supervision case there has been satisfactory communication from IFE to NRPA.

5. Findings During the inspectiondeviation and remarks

5.1. definitions
Deviation – failure to comply with the requirements established pursuant to law.
Remarks – conditions that are necessary to point out, but not covered by the definition of
deviation.
Comment – used to explain or substantiate discrepancies or remarks.

5.2. Deviation
It was given 4 discrepancies:
1. The IFE misinformed the NRPA on Tuesday 25 October 2016 when it was announced that the situation was under control. The IFE misinformed NRPA again repeatedly in the period 27 October to 1 November, when the issue of the reactor safety was mentioned, and the IFE reported that the situation was not unusual.
2.
The IFE failed to make good enough assessments of the situation and the possible consequences for reactor safety and security systems in the reactor hall, although it was discussed repeatedly in communication with the NRPA. A new assessment of reactor safety and the situation in the reactor hall was first made when NRPA requested documentation with signatures of responsible operations and safety managers.
3. By closing the valves and stop the primary cooling circuit, the reactor was put into a state that was not defined in the safety report (SAR).
The NRPA believes that the possible consequences of closed valves, elevated activity levels and high temperatures in the reactor hall for key instruments and security systems were not adequately evaluated or documented in advance or described in the SAR.
4. It is important that all conditions be taken seriously and that the IFE is continuing its efforts to improve the safety culture
in the organization and follow up orders and deviations from previous inspections. Safety work and safety culture at IFE was the subject of system inspections in 2014, cf. incident report 1/2014. The NRPA see this event as a deviation in connection with the safety culture cf. Deviations given in inspection report 1/2014. Greater progress should have been achieved in efforts to follow up the findings of the system revision and work to improve the safety culture of the organization

5.3. Remark

There were no remarks given under the inspection

5.4 Other conditions

There were no other conditions to report.

6. Follow-up after the inspection

The NRPA takes this incident very seriously and what can be seen as an inadequate monitoring of system revision. This will be followed by the NRPA. There is now close contact between NRPA and IFE. The IFE are following up by doing several diagnostics and screening procedures. The NRPA received report after the incident on 2 December 2016 and will also receive additional reports. The NRPA will use the reports in their efforts to follow up on the IFE. The NRPA will be overseeing the first quarter of 2017 with a focus on procedures and follow-up after the incident

Med hilsen

Per Strand and Tonje Sekse

Department Manager and Senior Advisor