Nuclear Hotseat notes for 21 March 2017


Image courtesy of CCI celebrating World Downs Syndrome Day (UN)

Link to the French report on the Unusual practices that have EDF fined for recruitment of workers for Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant via Cyrus, Ireland and Poland. The courts have issued fines, the contractors have been going insolvent and generally prevaricating with the court process;

Update on the Iodine 131 story and  the Halden connection Questions being asked by CRIIRAD ;

Questions about Iodine in Europe asked by CRIIRAD France in new report 14 March 2017 #Halden

Latest information on the Belarus AP court case that has gone to the higher court. The AP reporter has been asked to ignore the government laboratory evidence and apologise to the Dairy company that is selling contaminated milk to customers both domestic and abroad. Strontium 90 is worse than Cesium 137 as it does not leave the human body once ingested and seeks bones and heart tissue as it replaces calcium.

More on that story with a scientific explanation of the problem here;


Link to Chernobyl Children International web page. They deal with a number of Chernobyl radiation damaged conditions and their web page is celebrating World Downs Syndrome Day;

Link to evidence of the connection between Downs Syndrome and radiation here;

The objective of this study is to investigate the prevalence of Down syndrome (DS) associated with Chernobyl fallout. Maternal age-adjusted DS data and corresponding live birth data from the following seven European countries or regions were analyzed: Bavaria and West Berlin in Germany, Belarus, Hungary, the Lothian Region of Scotland, North West England, and Sweden from 1981 to 1992. To assess the underlying time trends in the DS occurrence, and to investigate whether there have been significant changes in the trend functions after Chernobyl, we applied logistic regression allowing for peaks and jumps from January 1987 onward. The majority of the trisomy 21 cases of the previously reported, highly significant January 1987 clusters in Belarus and West Berlin were conceived when the radioactive clouds with significant amounts of radionuclides with short physical half-lives, especially (131)iodine, passed over these regions. Apart from this, we also observed a significant longer lasting effect in both areas. Moreover, evidence for long-term changes in the DS prevalence in several other European regions is presented and explained by exposure, especially to (137)Cs. In many areas, (137)Cs uptake reached its maximum one year after the Chernobyl accident. Thus, the highest increase in trisomy 21 should be observed in 1987/1988, which is indeed the case. Based on the fact that maternal meiosis is an error prone process, the assumption of a causal relationship between low-dose irradiation and nondisjunction is the most likely explanation for the observed increase in DS after the Chernobyl reactor accident.
  Link here

And this link as well;

Effects of the Chernobyl Catastrophe
-Literature Review-
Dr. med. Alex Rosen
University Clinic
, Germany
Here is the link to the article explaining the UK pressure to take renewables more seriously than they have been;
“….It would also prove to be a major blow to Government plans to cut carbon emissions by encouraging 16GW of new nuclear investment to power the UK grid by 2030. More than two thirds of the country’s power generation capacity is due to retire between 2010 and 2030 meaning major investment in other technologies would be needed to bridge the gap…..”


Also, The UK is looking for 100 billion pounds for its Small Modular Reactor business and Bechtel has decided to withdraw from the UK program which may have wider implications for the international development of this technology. Rolls Royce, who are also involved with the UK SMR program are having financial difficulties and legal problems;

And this link shows the problems the UK is having concerning the Euratom Treaty obligations post Brexit causing further problems with the UK international agreements for things like the purchase of Fuel rods, University student academic access and nuclear waste disposal;

And finally, also to do with Euratom and the agreement within it to do with health effects that is being challenged by an number of people within the European community area, with the support of Prof Chris Busby. An update on the situation concerning European applications (watch till the end to see the Swedish Euratom representative begin to panic);


Questions about Iodine in Europe asked by CRIIRAD France in new report 14 March 2017 #Halden


Here is a roughly translated report from independent radiation monitoring and safety NGO CRIIRAD dated from the 12 March 2017  asking questions about the missing data measurements and unaccounted isotope measurements.

Clarification of CRIIRAD about the releases of a nuclear reactor in Norway


There has been confusion for a few days on
social networks, and messages that are very Worrying as “Alert in
this day (12 March 2017) it is learned that Norway has contaminated
all of Europe with radioactive iodine 131 for several weeks (it is
even said that contamination began at the end of October).. “.
This is a confusion between two events:
Iodine-131 (artificial radioactive isotope) has been detected at low levels in the ambient air of several European countries in January 2017. The exact origin of iodine-131 is not known and several hypotheses are possible. See CRIIRAD press release of February 14, 2017.
There was an incident on a nuclear reactor in Norway in October 2016, but there is not, to our knowledge, an Incident or Accident currently operating in Norway and the measuring stations whose the results are published on the website of the European network EURDEP do not show currently abnormal radioactivity in Norway or on nearby countries.
Releases of iodine 131 from a Norwegian reactor in October 2016 :
There was, on 24 October 2016 at 13:45 hours a significant incident on the EIT nuclear reactor at Halden South –East of Oslo in Norway, when handling the spent fuel. The Norwegian Radiological Protection reported this incident in a Press release of
25 October 2016 .
This incident, which led to the evacuation of the personnel and resulted in radioactivity released into the atmosphere.
The Norwegian authorities have estimated the release to 150 million becquerels for iodine 131 and 24 million becquerels for iodine 132. It should be noted that the document does not specify how these estimates have been carried out, nor their level of reliability. It is surprising that Authorities did not show the Status of other releasable radioactive substances (tritium,Carbon 14, radioactive rare gases). Fortunately, the situation has
been finally kept under control.
The “incident” of October 2016 poses many Safety issues (Origin of the incident), lack of transparency (the operator declared the incident 20 hours later), insufficient
monitoring data (No evaluation of all Radioactive discharges).”
The Norwegian NGO Bellona had expressed concern in 2004 about the Safety and Denounced the escapes of Heavy water and the high tritium releases (Radioactive isotope of hydrogen).
In the case of discharges of iodine-131 of 24 October 2016, in Norway, measurement stations of iodine 131 in particulate form located at Osteras, about 100 kilometers north – West of Halden and Arland, to 500 kilometers to the north had not highlighted measurable impact. (data available on the website EURDEP).
Iodine-131 particulate has indeed been detected
on the air filters of the October 17 to 24, 2016 with values of the
order of 0.37 to 0.45 μBq/m3, but the measurement period stopped
Around 6am so It was before the official time of release
On the following two weeks , published levels of
Iodine 131 were lower than detection limits between <0,3 µBq/m3
and these results raise a number of questions.
It is surprising, for example, to note the
absence of sampling for the Osteras station during the period of
supposed releases. Indeed, the analyzes focus on a first filter for
the period from 17 to October 24th at 6:34 am, then a second filter
of 25 October at 11 H30 to 26 October at 10 H49. There is therefore
no measure from October 24 at 6:35 am to October 25 at 11:29 am?
It is also possible to deplore the absence of measurement of iodine-131 in gaseous form which is in many cases predominant by contribution to the particular form .
And of course, it should be emphasized that the
measuring stations are at a great distance from the plant and do not
count of the air quality within a radius of a few kilometers.
To date, there is nothing to make the link between the iodine 131 from the Halden reactor in Norway in October 2016 and the detection of iodine 131 in the atmosphere of European countries in January 2017.
Let’s remember that the Half-life of iodine-131 is 8 days. The activity of iodine-131 rejected on 24 October 2016 would therefore be divided by a factor of 1300 to 15 January 2017 . In addition, the highest levels of particulate iodine
131detected in Europe in January 2017 were in Poland (5.9 μBq / m3).
However, it would be desirable for independent
analyzes to be carried out in the vicinity of the Halden reactor in
order to assess the levels of exposure of local residents (air, soil,
precipitation and food chain analyzes).
Writing: Bruno
CHAREYRON, engineer in nuclear physics, director of the CRIIRAD
laboratory with technical support from Jérémie MOTTE, environmental
engineer, head of the CRIIRAD air monitoring department.

Report in French;

Report from the NRPA in Norway from 13th February 2017 with an introduction (with links to other evidence and articles gathered) can be found here;

Fuel Error at IFE Halden – The handling of the incident – NRPA report in ENGLISH

“…“The example given by Norway strongly reinforces the importance and the value of establishing and applying IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance that contributes to the continuous improvement of physical protection and nuclear security,” said Muhammed Khaliq, Head of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security of Materials and Facilities Section.

The IPPAS team, led by Kristóf Horváth, Deputy Director General of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA), comprised eight experts from seven nations, including the IAEA representative, Mr Khaliq….” Oct 2015 Oslo


This report has been translated from the Norwegian in order to clarify the situation concerning confusion from some of the Pro nuclear lobby and anti nuclear movement highlighted on social media these past weeks. I have tried to get more information from sources to answer the issue as to why there was deleted data from EURDEP radiation mapping in Sweden and Norway just after this report was completed but to no avail, thus far.

The IFE were contacted by Peter for their comment on this incident. The initial impression Peter was given was that the Bellona report was inaccurate and claims by the IFE seems to show a concerted effort to minimise the risks that this reactor poses to the public. If a large plume had come from the Halden reactor on the 17th February into Sweden then the ESPOO treaty concerning cross border contamination on radiation may have been broken. This plume went on for some days and seems to have also hit most of southern Norway (east and west) as the wind changed direction.

However, there have been many claims that the Halden reactor was responsible for all iodine releases in Europe these past months and this is not true. Using EURDEP, I have tracked, as best as i could, the probable sources. There are two main sources of Iodine from Hungary  (January 2017)and Norway  (Oct 2016 and Feb 2017) and some smaller sources of gamma energy from Spain, Germany, France and possibly from the Italian area. This seems to have ruled out Halden as the only source of Iodine and all the reports of USA military planes checking out the Russian involvement in this scenario are false (this was also claimed by some main stream press also).

The IAEA has been efficient at removing most of the spikes and leaving no data. These spikes are removed as a matter of course in some countries because they claim it is normal Radon from the environment (NORM) but this is mostly not the case.

As to why Sweden might not want to highlight any plumes concerning issues on the ESPOO Treaty from Halden into their country, we only have to see the recent statement by the Swedish Radiation Safety Agency (SRSA) concerning the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research group (NKS) from the 9 March 2017;

“Above all, these evaluations have demonstrated that our approach is correct: We should continue to take part in these research fora,” says Eva Simic, director of research at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. “An additional perspective is that the fora underline the beneficial impact of NKS and Halden on our work, and highlight a number of areas we need to work on in order to benefit further from the collaboration. In other words, they provide valuable decision-making input when we discuss future research initiatives.”

It would seem that the Halden management of IFE has many friends that support anything they say but Bellona and the NRPA are holding IFE to task, though it is not widely reported by the main stream media. Bellona represent one of the few organisations that are trying to provide truly independent Science Media Journalism and even the Norwegian Governments own department the NRPA is trying to hold the IFE accountable and promote transparency in a technology that is renowned for secrecy and risk taking. Anyway, here is the full report by the NRPA on the Halden reactor and there should be another due in the near future to assess how IFE are dealing with the issues outlined in this report.. This link shows the original article and links posted on nuclear-news. Thanks to NIls Bohmer and the NRPA for allowing me to publish this report in full. Shaun McGee aka arclight 12th March 2017

Full report

Our ref .: 16/00889 /
The caseworker .: Tonje Sekse
Date: 02/13/2017

Fuel Error at IFE Halden – The handling of the incident

1 Introduction
Monday 24 October 2016 at. 1:45 p.m.
there was an incident in the treatment of the damaged reactor fuel at the Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) in its facility in Halden. As a result, there was an urgent release of radioactive substances into the reactor hall and into the surroundings. The reactor hall was evacuated and closed off. The IFE notified The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) Tuesday morning (October 25) and the ventilation system of the reactor hall was stopped. The discharge into the environment then stopped. The IFE informed the NRPA that the situation was under control on Tuesday night.

The day after the notification, Wednesday 26 October, The NRPA chose to conduct unannounced inspection at the IFE at their headquarters in Kjeller in connection with the late notification and the handling of the incident. During this inspection it was revealed that the situation was still unresolved and that there was still a discharge to the reactor hall. Because of this, the NRPA decided to create an enhanced inspection order for the IFE to follow up the late notification, the missing information, and the handling of the consequences of the incident, including the efforts to gain further control on the discharge from the damaged fuel.

As part of the enhanced inspection, a tighter communictaion regime between IFE and the NRPA was created for the future handling of the situation. IFE reported daily progress of the work, the size of the emissions in the reactor hall and into the surrounding environment, and planned future work. Personnel from the NRPA were present with IFE Halden during all operations in the reactor hall during the inspection period. As a part of the enhanced inspection, the NRPA conducted several interviews with personnel from IFE that were involved in handling of the incident. Most interviews were conducted on 10 and 25 November 2016. In addition, the NRPA had several video conferences with IFE personnel and their management. The NRPA also obtained copies of the relevant logs.

Their was a major inspection meeting between IFE and the NRPA in Halden, 25 November 2016. Present at the meeting were the following representatives from the NRPA and the IFE:

IFE: Atle Valseth – research director NSF
Geir Mjønes – department manager HBWR
Tord Walderhaug – s
afety chief / Radiation Protection Supervisor (Halden)
Kari Lyumer Moum – section head chemistry
Pål Thowsen – senior reactor engineering
Lise Moen – senior reactor physicist
Wolfgang Wiesenack – Research Director

NRPA: Per Strand – Department director
Kristin Frogg – technical director
Øyvind Gjølme Selnæs – senior adviser
Tonje Sekse – senior adviser

2. Current regulations
The enhanced inspection authority was notified on 25 October 2016 under the unannounced inspection on the same day. The Inspection was authorised by the Atomic Energy Act § 13 on inspection, and in the Pollution Control Act § 48 also on inspection.

3. Background, scope and implementation
The inspection was decided on and initiated in conjunction with the unannounced inspection on the 26 October 2016. As a part of the enhanced inspection the NRPA had ongoing dialogue with IFE in supervision period and has conducted several interviews with personnel at IFE that were involved in handling of the incident. The focus of the interviews was the individual’s role in the process of handling the damaged fuel, but also with the situation with the reactor. NRPA received copies of relevant logs in connection with this inspection.

The enhanced inspection was completed on December 2.

4. General impression
Previously the NRPA, as part of the unannounced inspection on the 26 October 2016, had reported errors for missing information and the late notification of the incident, ref. Inspection report 13/2016 . The enhanced inspection involves communication from IFE to NRPA, and the further handling of the incident.

The NRPA conducted interviews and obtained logs as part of the inspection. During the inspection meeting on 25 November 2016 IFE were handed the Emergency log, logs from the reactor engineer (of the control room), and log of the water chemistry for the relevant period. In addition the IFE subsequently forwarded logs of plant control, “the night round,” daily instructions and construction announcements, and print from Procsee showing signals / trends.

The primary cooling circuit is an important part of the safety system of the reactor. Valves which regulate the circulation of cooling water in the primary cooling circuit is dependent on the process air to be open. When the ventilation system of the reactor hall was stopped and the valves closed on Wednesday, the 26 October, one of the consequences was that the process air had to be closed off. Circulation in the primary cooling circuit was therefore suspended. The reactor was shut down when the incident with the damaged fuel occurred on the 24 October. IFE had informed that earlier that they had stoppages in circulation in the primary cooling circuit for longer periods of time in connection with maintenance and other work while the reactor was out of service.

From Thursday 27 October the safety of the reactor was a daily recurring theme between NRPA and IFE, where the NRPA repeatedly questioned the opinions about reactor safety and the closure of the primary cooling circuit. The IFE reported back that the situation was not unusual and that the reactor could stay in that condition for several weeks to come. The NRPA wanted greater transparency and traceability in the safety assessments that were made and demanded in a video meeting on Tuesday 1 November at. 2:00 pm, better documentation with declarations with signatures from the responsible operations and safety managers. A few hours later the same evening received the NRPA a concerning message from IFE that the reactor was “in a very special condition.”

The IFE asked NRPA for permission to open the valves and start circulation in the primary circuit as soon as possible. The reason for the message were the differences in temperature in the reactor tank, the indication of an increased neutron flux in the reactor core and the danger of hydrogen formation. For the NRPA this is a serious message and a completely different situation than the one the IFE had described a few hours earlier. This message was correct, but the NRPA questioned why this was not investigated earlier both because of security, but also because the regulatory authority had demanded this. The IFE received permission to open the valves and start the work to start primary cooling circuit and discharging the contaminated air from the reactor hall. Despite that there was still emissions from the damaged fuel emissions were within the emission limits in the permit.

The same night the IFE called in the reactor physicists who assessed the situation and found that indications were likely due to the impact on the instruments that were not calibrated for the conditions in the reactor hall as they were. IFE completed the planned measures, opened valves and started the primary cooling circuit. The situation was stable after this.

The NRPA takes the situation awareness, safety assessments and communication to the NRPA around reactor safety in the days leading up to IFE detected indication of increased neutron flux November 1st very seriously. The reactor was then, as the IFE described it, in a “very special state,” that was both unusual and not described in the safety report. The nuclear instrumentation were not calibrated for the conditions that were in the reactor hall. Nor was it the case, as stated earlier, that this was a situation that was normal and described in the safety report.

The NRPA observed that during the interviews given afterwards there was somewhat contradictory explanations and that there was still some confusion. The NRPA believes it is important that all conditions will be taken seriously, both technical failures and inadequate procedures. IFE must focus on efforts to improve the safety culture of the organization and follow up error reports from previous inspections.

It is pertinent to mention that after November 1, in the subsequent work on the handling of the damaged fuel and the ongoing supervision case there has been satisfactory communication from IFE to NRPA.

5. Findings During the inspectiondeviation and remarks

5.1. definitions
Deviation – failure to comply with the requirements established pursuant to law.
Remarks – conditions that are necessary to point out, but not covered by the definition of
Comment – used to explain or substantiate discrepancies or remarks.

5.2. Deviation
It was given 4 discrepancies:
1. The IFE misinformed the NRPA on Tuesday 25 October 2016 when it was announced that the situation was under control. The IFE misinformed NRPA again repeatedly in the period 27 October to 1 November, when the issue of the reactor safety was mentioned, and the IFE reported that the situation was not unusual.
The IFE failed to make good enough assessments of the situation and the possible consequences for reactor safety and security systems in the reactor hall, although it was discussed repeatedly in communication with the NRPA. A new assessment of reactor safety and the situation in the reactor hall was first made when NRPA requested documentation with signatures of responsible operations and safety managers.
3. By closing the valves and stop the primary cooling circuit, the reactor was put into a state that was not defined in the safety report (SAR).
The NRPA believes that the possible consequences of closed valves, elevated activity levels and high temperatures in the reactor hall for key instruments and security systems were not adequately evaluated or documented in advance or described in the SAR.
4. It is important that all conditions be taken seriously and that the IFE is continuing its efforts to improve the safety culture
in the organization and follow up orders and deviations from previous inspections. Safety work and safety culture at IFE was the subject of system inspections in 2014, cf. incident report 1/2014. The NRPA see this event as a deviation in connection with the safety culture cf. Deviations given in inspection report 1/2014. Greater progress should have been achieved in efforts to follow up the findings of the system revision and work to improve the safety culture of the organization

5.3. Remark

There were no remarks given under the inspection

5.4 Other conditions

There were no other conditions to report.

6. Follow-up after the inspection

The NRPA takes this incident very seriously and what can be seen as an inadequate monitoring of system revision. This will be followed by the NRPA. There is now close contact between NRPA and IFE. The IFE are following up by doing several diagnostics and screening procedures. The NRPA received report after the incident on 2 December 2016 and will also receive additional reports. The NRPA will use the reports in their efforts to follow up on the IFE. The NRPA will be overseeing the first quarter of 2017 with a focus on procedures and follow-up after the incident

Med hilsen

Per Strand and Tonje Sekse

Department Manager and Senior Advisor

Evidence for radiation release from Halden nuclear reactor in Norway into sweden

Wind maps for 17th 18th and 20th Feb 2017 Oslo and missing data points from EURDEP in Sweden, Norway and one reading from Denmark showing the radiation was OK on the 20th .

Winds did come from the north at times and also from the southeast as well during these dates, early If a release was done in the early hours/morning of the 17th Feb 2017, the plume would have moved into Sweden and then later been sent west.

The data on the Denmark monitor was largely missing but did actually have the 20th Feb 2017 data showing normal radiation levels

I added some radiation monitoring data from the east coast of Norway and heading north (including one monitor in the mountains)  from there to show that a lesser plume made this distance but the data removed was for a shorter time frame. The wind maps show that the direction of the wind did also, at times, head east to account for this Plume.

I also checked the Finnish monitoring system but the data was generally intact but for a small brief rise on one east coast of Finland monitor  showing the plume was likely dissipated or broken up over the Baltic sea.

Data compiled by Shaun McGee

Historical wind chart data from Norway;

Radiation Mapping data from;

Note; The Halden reactor monitor for October 2016 (the original release) was for only a few hours and the data is missing to show that. Over a few months some small rises and missing data points are evident but the largest period of missing data in February 2017 is the same as the Oslo data maps below, over a few days.

Nuclear Hotseat notes for 1st March 2017

Sellafield: UK on track to miss key nuclear waste target

“The UK’s biggest nuclear site is failing to cut radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea in line with international commitments, according to a new report.

Sellafield, which was at the heart of the recent Copeland by-election, has been discharging more low level radioactive wastes – resulting from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel – into the North East Atlantic in recent years than it was a decade ago, the latest available data shows.

Anti-nuclear group CORE, which crunched the numbers, says that this means the UK has already violated the OSPAR convention to reduce radioactivity in the maritime environment, as was agreed nearly 20 years ago.

There have been several surges in environmental discharges from Sellafield in recent years, which may go against the spirit of OSPAR, which orders a ‘progressive’ and ‘substantial’ reduction.

It also suggests that the UK may struggle to achieve the goal of cut radioactive discharges to ‘close to zero’ by 2020.”

‘Picking losers’ – UK must not risk taxpayers’ billions on failed nuclear dream

David Toke

27th February 2017

“With the world’s leading nuclear corporations facing bankruptcy due to ever escalating costs, ‘unconstructable’ reactor designs and financing risks, there’s an easy way to finance the UK’s new nuclear power stations, writes David Toke: pin the cost onto taxpayers. As for schools, hospitals, pensions, housing, social care and other public services, who needs ’em?”

UK nuclear power stations ‘could be forced to close’ after Brexit

“Leaving Euratom treaty will shut down nuclear industry if international safety agreements are not made in time, MPs told”

“But the Office for Nuclear Regulation argued there could even be be some positives to leaving Euratom, such as a reduction in bureaucracy. “If we relinquish Euratom there would be reduced burden from not having to comply with directives,” said David Senior, an ONR executive.”

NO Update on the situation at research reactor IFE Halden, Norway.. YET!

Published 04.11.2016

Keywords: Preparedness ??????  LOL

The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) continues to have an elevated level of inspection at the Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) due to the incident at the research reactor in Halden 24 October.

There has been progress dealing with the damaged fuel in the reactor hall, but work still remains to be done. The NRPA have also been particularly concerned about the safety of the reactor and have asked IFE to make several assessments regarding the reactor situation. IFE has assessed the situation and followed up with additional safety measures.

IFE have now initiated circulation of the reactor coolant for example. This means that contaminated air from the reactor hall is being filtered to reduce iodine levels and then released to the atmosphere. This controlled release from IFE-Halden is low level and below permitted limits stated in the operating license. The release has no environmental or health consequences.

The NRPA remain in close contact with IFE and have inspection personnel on-site at Halden most of the time, and during all operations. The NRPA are also continuously being updated about any changes in the situation.


Sources for this weeks European report

The Ecologist, The Guardian, Greenpeace UK and the NRPA Norway

Nuclear Hotseat notes for 22 Feb 2017 Iodine 131 in Europe, the evidence!

The media are trying to blame the Russians (Of course 🙂 ).. there has also been other reactor problems in Europe..

Norway has damaged fuel in its Halden research reactor since  Oct last year 2016  (reported) and it is releasing Iodine 131 but they said then that they are filtering the releases and none is getting out of the building.. Ukraine is straining their reactors because right wing Kiev mobs are blocking coal from the Russian eastern side.

This last week the Eurdep mapping was turned off in Ukraine, Poland and Russian monitoring was stopped for the same period and these monitoring stations are still offline today .. And in another incident, there has been a release a few days ago from Spain I think? ..

Also Irelands rad monitoring was switched off on Sunday morning, probably because of a release from Flamanville (France) that is having problems getting restarted  or maybe Sellafield (UK) .. some small evidence on the Irish EURDEP for that (I have a screenshot above ) .. A reactor in Germany is off gassing with a very high spike shown on the Eurdep monitor map from last week probably due to maintenance or refueling of the reactor.

On the widely January 2017 reported release likely from the ancient Budapest Medical Isotope Institute in Hungary

Hervé Courtois “In November 2011, for example, iodine-131 had been detected in air in several European countries and the survey4 had led to the rejection of iodine-131 from a radioisotope production institute in Budapest ( Hungary). Measurements carried out by the CRIIRAD laboratory in November 2011 confirmed a significant contamination of the vegetation with iodine-131 and iodine-125 in Budapest, several kilometers from this nuclear site.”

Criirad file on the January 2017 release in French (use Google translate);

Eurdep radiation mapping mostly gets switched of when there is an unintended release. This is done by the IAEA to protect the nuclear industry and have it seem in a better light.

Link to Eurdep, Europes radiation maps

An example of a switch off and peaks before from Ireland withing the last week (possibly to do with Flamanville or Sellafield nuclear sites;

In short the January release was due to the Budapest Medical Isotope Institute and the IAEA are covering it up again. A shortage of medical isotopes is causing increased releases of a number of isotopes and Iodine 131 is the easiest to measure. The pollution near the source should be made public as this area will have contaminated milk an vegetables. It is a crime that under privileged children are allowed to get cancer so that over privileged adults can be treated for cancer!

Here is the report on the Thorium reactor in Norway called Halden; : Incident in Oct and report from Nov 2016;

In other news mentioned in the report .. Toshiba shares falling further;

UK and French nuclear news

EDF France, the writings on the wall for energy!

EDF faces £1m a day bill to keep Flamanvile nuclear reactor offline

Worries over UK’s decision to quit Euro nuclear agency

Report by Shaun McGee for Nuclear Hotseat

Sources for the show;

Eurdep,, Herve Courtois, CRIIRAD, Safecast, Bellona , NRPA (Norway) , Nikkei, US9.campaign , The Guardian,

European report for Nuclear Hotseat podcast 14 February 2017 – Notes


Links to EDF closing down the radiation monitoring system during and after the explosion at the Flamanville nuclear power station and the risk to the Channel Islands because of the wind direction (This risk was denied by UK experts on a report done for the Channel Islands communities) Exclusive to;

Flamaville – More missing radiation data, From the 7th Feb 2017 from nuclear station

Flamaville nuclear owners EDF block nuclear-news article on Google search

Flamaville in flames – Radiation report and hidden spike? Heading towards the Channel Islands

Link to the report from Bristol University on the UK Government bodies underestimating the real cost to human life in their official reports;

Breaking – U.K. nuclear safety regulations place too low a value on human life

Link to a discussion (with sources) on the UK problems using Tax payers money to bail out the UK nuclear new builds;

UK Ministers “forced” to throw taxpayers cash at nuclear plants – Step 1 bail out – To get “skin in the game”!

Links to the Toshiba and Westinghouse financial reports mentioned within the segment;

Westinghouse may also be forced out of nuclear plant construction business

French EDF heading down the toilet after Flamanaville nuclear near miss!

Link to the Russian nuclear reactors flaws report;

Links to Thyroid stories discussing the issues resulting from the Fukushima Diachi 2011 nuclear accident;

Fukushima Blues – Is Thyroid Cancer good for you and does it help if you smile?

Fukushima – Comparison of childhood thyroid cancer prevalence among 3 areas based on external radiation dose

more resources and background here;

Attribution sources from media

Department of Homeland Security USA media

The Times UK

Paul Dorfman

Bristol University


EURDEP radiation mapping